

# A Review on Block Chain System for Supply Chain Network

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**Abstract:** Blockchain associated study is still in its beginning, and is focuses mostly on security and scalability. Very few of this research work clarifies its impact and design problems from management point of view, specifically from the point of view of Supply Chain Management (SCM). To examine the effect of blockchain technology (BCT) on SCM and the implicit design issues, we contemplate a generic stochastic model, where an organization try to maximize the total expected concessional benefit, by jointly dealing (i) blockchain design, (ii) production and ordering verdicts, and (iii) dynamic pricing and selling. We first display that the applying BCT can support organization in decreasing order numbers, dropping selling prices and decreasing target-inventory levels. It is also shown that instability of either supply or demand decreases the probable profit. The study is vigorous with some foremost extensions, such as lost-sales of demand and arbitrary capacity.

**Key words:** Blockchain Design, Blockchain-Savvy Consumers, Supply Chain, Random Yields, Dynamic Pricing.

## 1. Introduction

Blockchain Technology (BCT) has been extensively comprised as an innovative technology, however it is still in an emerging phase; cf. Babich and Hilary (2018). Indeed, the route to wide blockchain implementation appear luminously and outstandingly well covered. In a most recent survey for the PwC Annual Report 2018, out of 600 executives from 15 territories, 84% claim their firms have had at least some contribution with BCT. To grab on this innovative and disruptive technology, firms have either experimented in the lab with BCT, or have started to build proofs of concept; cf. PwC (2018). Gartner Inc. presents that blockchain's value-added business will grow to \$176 billion by 2025, and that BCT will make a yearly business of greater than US \$3 trillion by 2030; cf. Piscini et al. (2017). Hopefully, it can be assumed that 10% to 20% of the worldwide financial infrastructure will be operating on blockchain-built structures by that same year (ibid). Hence, the capability to organize BCT to generate the next era of digital supply chain systems and platforms will be a vital player in business success; cf. Pawczuk (2017).

This innovative technology and its flourishing executions have also involved the attention of academic world. As mentioned in Simchi-Levi (2018), it is authoritative for the MS/OR

community to observe “the impact of emerging technologies such as Blockchain and the Internet of Things (IoT) on the management of operations and supply chain”. Recently, Babich and Hilary (2018) deliver an extensive representation on the research guidelines of BCT in the OM field. In specific, it is highlighted that OM researchers can use insights from the literature to enumerate the value of the Blockchain technology in processes. This study influences to this academic call in an appropriate manner.

### **1.1. Introduction of Blockchain Technology**

Though the key idea behind BCT was introduced in 1991, it only brought the attention of the community in 2009 with the introduction of Bitcoin. Till now, there is very precise research providing a complete and wide study of BCT, specifically with regard to its role in supply chain management. Hence, in this introductory segment, we begin by providing a complete review of BCT.

Blockchain technology states to a circulated database that keeps a continuously-growing list of data records that are protected from altering and revision. It comprises of blocks having groups of individual transactions. Each block comprises a timestamp and a connection to a prior block; cf. Nakamoto (2008), and Kim and Laskowski (2018). Traditional business models sustain the complete history of activities in a single centralized database, which is very exposed to cyberattack. BCT allocates databases (ledgers) to all users, which presents the consent mechanism concept; since it is very tough to attack multiple databases concurrently, the blockchain system is supposed to be both secure and transparent. The feature of consent in blockchain system rejects any concern that a single centralized organization may operate transaction data, or ask high fees for crucial facilities, etc. Fig. 1 describes a basic blockchain system process.

Generally, BCT has the following prominent features and advantages:

- (i) *Transparency*: Blockchain uses the idea of distributed consent, all its users are proficient for reading the complete history of activities, which in turn significantly improves data transparency.
- (ii) *Traceability*: Access to timestamped archives permits users to successfully and proficiently trace data history.
- (iii) *Security*: A distributed record rises the trouble of staging a cyberattack, which expressively reinforces data security.
- (iv) *Efficiency*: BCT substitutes the necessity for a centralized database, disintermediation can be accomplished. That is, it is no longer compulsory to have a reliable intermediary, such as


a bank, to maintain the database; hence, both transaction processing time and cost can be decreased.

(v) *Confidentiality*: A blockchain's decentralized architecture significantly increases security and transparency; though, it increases other concerns as to privacy, since each user can view all activities on the network. As an outcome, BCT tries to protect the privacy of users and their data by using pseudo addresses and advanced cryptology to hide some features of their activities.

(vi) *Immutability*: Once a transaction or action is authenticated by a blockchain system, it can no longer be inverted or modified. In opinion of this, the integrity of its data can significantly decrease the cost of assessing.

**Figure 1 The Blockchain Process**

**FIGURE:** Blockchain Characteristics of Transparency: Distributed Consensus



A block carried information is created by a user and then distributed to all users for verification. Once the info block is verified by all users, it is then added to the existing blockchain in all users' ledgers. The distributed consensus concept thus comes from the idea that information is no longer verified and maintained by a centralized organization but distributed to all blockchain users. The entire information history is visible to all users via distributed ledgers and is thus representing information transparency.

Specified the above-mentioned features of *immutability*, *security*, *transparency* and *efficiency*, BCT remarkably strengthens trust amongst participants. If efficiently applied, it is capable of ensuring that all the information accessed by participants is reliable and has not been available to altering in any way, which greatly resolves the problem of information asymmetry.

The first extensively known case of using BCT is in the financial services, specifically, the uses of Bitcoin as a now multiplying crypto currency. The above-mentioned features of BCT permit Bitcoin to do transactions in an extremely secure and efficient way. Additionally, Bitcoin's fabulous (although controversial) achievement leads people to think of the opportunity of applying it in other circumstances, such as in supply chain management. Fig. 2 defines a role of BCT for organic fruits, such as apples.



**Figure 2 Blockchain Example in SCM: Organic Apple**

**FIGURE:** Blockchain Characteristics of Traceability – Apple Example

BLOCKCHAIN LEDGER					
1. Farm Info Block	2. Planting Info Block	3. Harvest Info Block	4. Storage Info Block	5. Transportation Info Block	6. Retailer Info Block
FARM NAME	SEED ORIGIN	DATE	ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS	CAREER	NAME
FARM ADDRESS	VARIETY	METHOD	LOCATION	TRANSPORTATION MODE	ADDRESS
CERTIFICATION ON SITE	DATE	BATCH SIZE	DURATION	DURATION	
INSPECTIONS					

The accessibility of information for apples has been theoretically and empirically proven to be critical for market growth. With BCT, an apple may carry traceable and immutable information of the entire history from farm to market place, which can stimulate customers' willingness to pay and boost market growth.

## 1.2. Blockchain for SCM

In association to its applications in the Financial section, the implementation of BCT in SCM is still in its initial stages; with very limited identified cases in use up to now; cf. Babich and Hilary (2018). The main difference among the use of BCT in Finance and SCM lies in their core values. The core value for financial implementation is *information security*, however the core value for SCM application is *system transparency and traceability*.

Generally, BCT could be implemented in SCM in three convincing aspects: *disintermediation, smart contracts and as a solution to information irregularities*. Accordingly, we shall develop on these specific features that will stimulate our modelling norms.

The transparency quality of BCT eliminates the requirement of a transitional for paperwork processing (e.g., transportation, customs clearance, quality inspection, transactions, etc.), which significantly improves efficiency of business. This means that, BCT implementation could reduce the cost from suppliers. One of the eminent features aided by BCT is the *Smart Contract*. Smart Contracts allow contracts to be automatically imposed and implemented instantly when predefined conditions/terms are shown and confirmed. One possible Smart Contract implementation is in the art industry. In case of a music industry, a

Smart Contract allows royalties to be automatically circulated among artists and songwriters in actual time, based on a previous agreement among two parties. In case of the Smart Contract, BCT acceptance could secure high quality supply and improve both the production and profit respectively.

In contrast to it, we should focus on the working of BCT for information irregularity issues. It is known that the quality of information regarding a product or service is mainly asymmetric between sellers and customers, it is proved, both theoretically and practically, that quality monitoring certified by an approved third party is the best result to information irregularity; cf.

McCluskey (2000), Giannakas (2002), Rousseau and Vranken (2013). Considering organic food as an example with respect to the credence feature, customers are unable to find difference between organic foods and conventional foods, either before or after consumption. Also, the production cost of organic foods is somewhat higher than that of conventional foods. As customers have no source of distinguishing between them, they are only prepared to pay the same for both types of products, which in return does not provide any incentive for sellers to produce organic foods, and hence the organic food market may fail ultimately. In order to inspire the organic food market, a significant amount of research projected that labelling certified by an approved third party (e.g., FDA and USDA) is the only method for providing organic product information that will help customers distinguish. Numerous studies show that a rising number of customers are interested in products grown in a social-, environmental-, eco- and health-friendly way; *ibid.* Rousseau and Vranken (2013) demonstrate that customers are willing to pay an around 25% price more for organic apples even without the facility of information. With the facility of information on the genuine environmental health effects of organic apple growth, the price premium grows to about 42%. This result discloses two main aspects on price and demand: First, customers are ready to pay more for organic foods; second, the system of information would increase demand. This will assist as an most important assumption for price-active and blockchain-savvy customers in our model, namely, that customers are active to both selling price and blockchain acceptance. Hence, decisions made on both selling price and BCT acceptance are imperious to confirming business success. To record the aforesaid main features of BCT, we contemplate a generic model in x3, with cost effective, development of random yield, and enrichment of unusual demand restricting from BCT adoption. As previously discussed, disintermediation and having a Smart Contract can significantly improve operative efficiency and improve partnerships along the supply

chain. Consequently, in our model we firstly consider that BCT implementation can efficiently reduce ordering and functioning cost, and that the higher the degree of BCT implementation, the more cost efficient a business can attain. Secondly, thanks to the Smart Contract, we consider that the supply yield is random and certainly interrelated with the degree of BCT implementation. The fundamental justification is that once a company adopts to reveal more product information to its possible dealers, it is more possible to find a better dealer that can offer a more better yield rate, reflecting a consistent supply along with high quality. Thirdly, the traceability shown by Blockchain technology's "*proof of work*" concept disables the information irregularity problem among the participants along the supply chain. Considering, blockchain-savvy (or, broadly tech-savvy) customers, we consider that the arbitrary demand can be increased by BCT implementation - the greater the degree of implementation, the greater the demand, in the better sense.

In summary, thanks to the above-mentioned features, BCT has been comprised as a powerful tool to solve the problem of information irregularity. Many case studies have described that information availability and truthfulness are two major forces for making a flourishing credibility goods market. Accordingly, we noticed that BCT can assist as the best solution for sharing information through the supply chain while at the same time confirming its authenticity.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we have shown literature appropriate to our study and clarify the involvement of this study. Finally, Section 3 concludes the paper.

## **2. Literature Review**

BCT basically offers a stage that enables users to access secure, consistent and tamper-proof facts in an efficient manner. Currently, there is limited research studying the effect of BCT and related design issues from management point of view, specially from the perception of Supply Chain Management; cf. Simchi-Levi et al. (2008). Most recently, Babich and Hilary (2018) provide a wide depiction on the research guidelines stemming from BCT in the OM field. They find five key strengths and the equivalent five main weaknesses, and point out three research subjects for applying BCT to OM. Pun et al. (2018) examine how BCT can be used to combat counterfeiting by a consideration of the relationship between a manufacturer and a counterfeiter. Besides the above-mentioned academic studies, there are various technical reports relating to BCT, such as Staples et al. (2017), Luu (Jan. 26, 2018), Geer (2018), O'Byrne (Mar. 27, 2018), Hertig (Mar 21, 2018), Pawczuk (2017) Piscini et al. (2017), Brody (2017), Casey and Wong (2017), and many others. In contrast to the above literature, our

study goals to examine the design of BCT for supply chain management by the development of a holistic stochastic model, where the acceptance of BCT impacts both the up-stream (suppliers) and the down-stream (consumers).

Given that data transparency shows a key role in BCT, we next focus on the literature relating to *information sharing* and *information asymmetry*. Table 1 displays a side-by-side comparison of our study with current *Information Sharing*<sup>1</sup> and *Information Asymmetry*<sup>2</sup> literature. It also highlights the impact of our study makes to the currently extant literature.

### **2.1. Literature on Information Sharing**

The profits of information sharing within a supply chain have been broadly examined and discussed. Lee et al. (1997) show that the major cause of the Bullwhip effect is variability of ordering, and Srinivasan et al. (1994) propose that information sharing is an operative solution for the Bullwhip effect so as to decrease order variation. Additionally, Lee et al. (2000) build mathematical models grounded on a two-level supply chain system including of a manufacturer and a retailer, to show that information sharing would value manufacturers by reducing inventory and saving cost. Yu et al. (2001) gives a rigorous analysis of supply chain strategic firms, and show that an information sharing-based firms can efficiently reduce inventory,

save cost, and improve the overall performance of a decentralized supply chain. The studies on

information sharing mostly focus on the organisation between the retailer and wholesaler (or vendor/manufacturer) to investigate the value of demand information sharing. Most studies draw the conclusion that a wholesaler would reap the profits of modification of order variation and reduction of inventory from the demand data shared by a retailer, who has straight contact with the customers and is thus more aware with their tastes and demands.

### **2.2. Literature on Information Asymmetry**

Information asymmetry is a usual and long-lasting phenomenon along the length of the supply

chain, covering the whole way from upstream through to downstream. For the upstream supply

chain, supply agreement design is established based on the asymmetric information of supplier

reliability. Various supply risk management tools are developed to this, such as a fine for losses, backup production (Yang et al. (2009)), outsourcing earning service (Yanget al.

(2012)), monetary subsidy (Babich (2010)), etc. The aim of the supply contract design is to increase buyers' benefit/profit by enlightening suppliers' true reliability established on the contract decisions made by suppliers. Yang et al. (2009) studies the asymmetric information of supply distortion between a manufacturer and a supplier, and concludes that "*the quantity received by the manufacturer from the supplier under symmetric information is stochastically*

<sup>1</sup>Information Sharing literature includes but is not limited to Lee et al. (1997), Srinivasan et al. (1994), Lee et al. (2000), Yuet al. (2001), Cui et al. (2015), etc.

<sup>2</sup>Information Asymmetry literature includes but is not limited to Akerlof (1978), Kivetz and Simonson (2000), Rousseau and Vranken (2013), McCluskey (2000), etc.

*larger than the quantity received under asymmetric information*". In other words, information disclosure increases supply yield. Our study also undertakes that the acceptance of BCT enhances supply yield - the greater the degree of adoption, the greater the yield rate, in the stochastic sense.

As for the downstream supply chain, Akerlof (1978) point out that asymmetric information about product quality could source market collapse. In a market with asymmetric information about product quality, such as the used car market, good quality products would be moved out

by bad ones, since customers are not clever of quality differentiation. Various empirical studies support that information disclosure by labelling is an effective way to sustain market having asymmetric information about product quality. For example, Teisl et al. (2002) provide market-based proof supporting that the dolphin-safe label increased the market share of canned tuna. Rousseau and Vranken (2013) find that customers are willing to pay a helpful price premium of some 33 eurocent per kilogram for labelled organic apples. In addition, honesty of information is another critical issue. Giannakas (2002) indicates that labeling alone is not enough to support a market with information asymmetry - consumers' perception toward the validity of information given by labels would be a prerequisite to sustaining the market. If mislabelling conquers, consumers will lose faith in the labels, and the market will still fail. In other words, the above-mentioned studies support that accurate information (one of the salient features of BCT) plays a vital role in market success.

### **2.3. Literature on Blockchain-Based Business Practices**

Various professional analysts claim that BCT will be the next technology to transform business

and reshape business structures and ecosystems. Accordingly, huge amounts of research and



investigation have been made into Bitcoin and other crypto currencies, each of which has BCT as its backbone. Recently, more and more businesses have started to value opportunities to apply BCT to improve their supply chain performance. Walmart and Maersk recently club up with IBM to test the implementation of BCT in improving operational efficiency. In particular, Walmart's pilot project shows that BCT can positively reduce the time taken to touch the origin of a bag of mangos from almost a week to just two seconds, which decodes in sizable cost savings. However, until now, only limited academic effort has been put into examining blockchain applications in SCM. Among this scarce research, most of them attention on blockchain-based business process design. For example, López-Pintado et al. (2017) propose a blockchain-based combined supply chain process. Tian (2016) explores the possibility of BCT enabled by RFID to build up food safety, and a business process is planned accordingly. Mattila et al. (2016) claim that existing information. Mixing between participants within a

Table 1 Literature Comparison

	<b>INFO. SHARING</b>	<b>INFO. ASYMMETRY</b>	<b>OUR PAPER</b>
<b>SELLER-BUYER REALTIONSHIP DEFINITION</b>	Seller: Vendor, supplier and manufacturer Buyer: Retailer	Seller: Suppliers of credence goods Buyer: Consumer of credence goods	Any seller and buyer within a supply chain
<b>INFO. FLOW</b>	Buyer to seller	Seller to buyer (Downward)	Seller to buyer (Downward)
<b>INFO. CONTENT</b>	Demand Forecasting Info	Product-centric info	Product-centric info
<b>OBJEC OF INFO SHARING</b>	Adjacent Upstream partners	Consumers of finished goods	Any consumer (of raw material, semi-finished goods) within a supply chain
<b>RESEARCH FOCUS</b>	Optimization of business decisions, e.g. lot size, safety stock, inventory level, production cycle, etc. Reduction of Bullwhip effect	Impact of information availability (via labelling, warranty, branding, etc.) to market, demand, and willingness to pay	Blockchain design and optimization of adoption degree
<b>RESEARCH METHOD</b>	Optimization/game theory, etc.	Surveys/interviews/ game theory, etc.	Optimization
<b>EXAMPLES</b>	Widely discussed, including perishable/ non-perishable goods, service, etc.	Credence goods	Search goods/ Experience goods/ Credence goods
<b>SOLUTION</b>	ERP, RFID, vendor managed inventory (VMI), etc.	Brand Name, labeling, certificate, warranty, etc.	Blockchain Technology

<b>SUGGESTIONS</b>	A certain partnership within a SC is required	Availability and truthfulness of information is critical	Different adoption degree of BCT is proposed for different types of industry.
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supply chain is ineffective and inefficient, and proposes BCT as an enabler for operative product-centric information sharing. Similarly, Korpela et al. (2017) assert that a blockchain is a suitable candidate for information integration within the supply chain, given its benefits of cost-effectiveness and interoperability among different business entities.

They further classify different levels of needs and readiness by different industries for digitization of supply chain network information, but fail to additionally examine the reasons behind it. It seems that the most fundamental research theme has not yet been fully analysed - whether or not BCT is helpful for all kinds of industries; if not, what is the level of data disclosure that an industry/company/product should adopt when applying BCT? This is one of the core questions that this study objective to address.

#### **2.4. Literature on Inventory Management and Pricing**

In terms of methodology and modelling, our work is also concerned with the wide literature on joint pricing and inventory management under stochastic demand; cf. Li and Zheng (2006), Roels and Perakis (2006), and Adida and Perakis (2010).

The most complete literature is that of Li and Zheng (2006), who also provide a full literature review on joint pricing and inventory control. Attentive readers are recommended to refer to their work. Li and Zheng (2006) was the first to study the joint inventory replenishment and pricing barriers with both indefinite demand and supply in various periods, and our model is built on theirs with a substantial extension in depth of the continuing adoption of BCT, while focusing on the blockchain designing for SCM. In the presence of indefinite supply and demand, they show that, given different levels of inventory on hand, there exist optimum ordering/production quantity and price/demand levels. Both optimum price and ordering/production quantity decrease with the inventory level on hand. Additionally, they sum up that indefinite supply always results in a higher price and dangers the expected profit of a company. Our study differs from Li and Zheng (2006) in several ways. For example, we emphasize on the impression of BCT adoption on optimum operational decisions. Importantly, we take it a step further, by considering the design issue for the structure. Our study is also related to the OM literature on new technology adoption. For example, Liu et al. (2010) investigate the impact of RFID on supply reliability. Both study the impact of the new

technology adoption on SCM, but RFID and BCT have different stages of impact along the supply chain network. In particular, BCT will have a broader impact throughout the entire supply chain, including both upstream (i.e., supply cost reduction and yield improvement) and downstream (i.e., demand stimulation). Some associated literature includes Feng and Shanthikumar (2018) considering big data, and Cohen et al. (2015) seeing green technology adoption.

## **2.5. Input to the Literature**

The contribution our study makes to the literature is mainly in the following four features.

First

of all, to the best of our knowledge, this is the primary study to systematically model and analyse the potentiality of blockchain development from a supply chain perspective. Secondly, this paper updated from the traditional way that supply chain management studies approach the issue of information impact on supply chain performance. Instead of mainly focusing on the impact of retailers' upward demand information distribution to wholesalers, our model can be generally applied to any body within the supply chain; the information flow of our study is in both directions, rather than upward only; the content of information in this paper is supply information, rather than demand information. Thirdly, this paper is interdisciplinary across marketing, information system and operations management, so we apply some study results from marketing, including information irregularity for credence goods, leveraging BCT to boost market growth, etc. The conclusion made by many marketing studies that information accessibility would boost demand and increase consumers' inclination to pay (CWP) is applied as an assumption by this paper to examine the optimal information disclosure level for dealers. A business process implemented using BCT, as proposed by the information study result, is applied by this paper to assist as a basis for investigating information flow. Fourthly, this study offers a modelling framework for BCT design by picking the adoption degree to share information throughout supply chain.

## **2.6. Practical Insights with Numerical Studies**

Based on previous experience of new technological uprisings (e.g., those involving the Cloud Computing, AI, Big Data, IoT, etc.), there appears to be a main wonder in the existing business environment that whenever new technology appears, many companies irrationally rush to be the first to implement it and exploit the first mover advantage. Naturally, no one wants to be an abandoned failure. This study, therefore, develops of timely value, since it objects to aid as a guideline for defining whether a business is suitable for using BCT, and if so, it then advises

the appropriate level of adoption. To illustrate some useful managerial intuitions, we conduct numerical studies in two dimensions: i) Vertically, we consider different types of products; and ii) horizontally, we consider different stages of a product development.

First, for the vertical dimension, we look into different goods that can be wedged by different blockchain-savvy buyers. Based on the observability of superiority, goods can be classified into three categories: 1) search goods; 2) experience goods; and 3) credence goods<sup>3</sup>; cf. Nelson (1970), Darby and Karni (1973).

1) *Search goods*: There is seamless information about quality for search goods, which explains that consumers can easily differentiate good from depraved products before consumption.

2) *Experience goods*: It is problematic or pricey for consumers to inspect the quality of experience goods prior to consumption; whereas consumers can determine their quality after consumption.

<sup>3</sup>SEC arrangement is slightly subjective, because the ability of assessment of product quality differs by persons. For example, a technology geek might view PCs as search goods, but others, with limited computer knowledge, might consider PCs as knowledge goods.

3) *Credence goods*: It is problematic or pricey for consumers to determine the quality of credence goods even after consumption. Examples of credence goods include works of arts (e.g., antiques), organic products, used cars, luxury goods (e.g., diamonds), high end food (e.g., wine, seafood, beef), facilities (e.g., doctors and medical services, auto mechanical service, lawyer service, donated eggs/sperm, etc).

As one of the major outcomes, it is exposed that, subject to tech-savvy customer behaviour, some types of goods (e.g., credence goods and experience goods) benefit from the application of BCT, but it may not prove advantageous to power BCT for some of the others (e.g., search goods). For the horizontal dimension, we study the lifecycle of a distinctive product (e.g., experience goods), comprised of Introduction, Evolution, Maturity, and Deterioration. One major insight from this study leads to endorsing the adoption of BCT as early as possible and for adopting it to a advanced degree at an earlier phase.

### **3. Concluding Remarks**

In this paper, we have studied the impact of block chain technology on supply chain performance, and its optimum design. In specific, we have considered a ordinary firm that orders from its supplier and sells to its tech-savvy consumers. From the viewpoint of both

its up-stream supply and down-stream customers, BCT implementation impacts the casual supply and demand in a stochastic way. The firm seeks to make the most of the total expected reduced profit, by equally managing (i) blockchain design, (ii) production and ordering decision, and (iii) dynamic pricing and selling. It has been revealed that the positioning of BCT can help firms decrease order quantities, lesser selling prices and decrease the target-inventory levels. It has also been made known that the instability of either supply or demand damages the expected profit. Although we have tried to consider the main features of BCT, there are absolutely some other convincing factors that need to be considered to enhance the research. As one potential future research project, blockchain technology could significantly shorten the lead times of transactions, as well as at the same time speed up both information processing times and paperwork processing.

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